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INTRODUCTION

Supreme Court case law teaches us that the federal interest in
arbitration does not consist of enforcing agreements to arbitrate
according to some sort of abstract or ideal arbitral model, but rather
according to the particular arbitral model upon which the parties had
agreed.1 This body of law is driven by the same notions of party
autonomy that underlie the law of arbitration generally. 2 That parties
may agree to forego access to national courts in favor of arbitration is an
initial manifestation of that attitude. By logical extension, the parties
also enjoy extraordinary latitude in determining the features that "their"
eventual arbitration should display.

* Walter Gellhom Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Professor of European
Union Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
2. See generally A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, at 144-45 (1981).
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A legal system that elevates party autonomy in arbitration to such a
high level of importance ought, at least in principle, to develop some
consistent methodology for identifying the arbitral features that the
parties intended for their arbitration. United States arbitration law
simply has not done so, thus leaving arbitrators and courts alike
somewhat at sea. For the arbitrators, there is more at stake than merely
respecting party preferences, important though that is. A tribunal that
deviates substantially from the procedures agreed upon by the parties,
and insisted upon by one of them, risks finding its award vacated 3 or
denied recognition or enforcement.4 Of course, for any number of
reasons, an award resulting from an arbitral process that deviated from
party intentions may nevertheless survive and earn recognition or
enforcement: the deviation may be regarded as insubstantial; 5 the
complaining party may be deemed to have waived its objections or
otherwise acquiesced; 6 or the general latitude that arbitrators enjoy in
matters of procedure may operate to shield the award.7
The fault, if that is the right term, lies of course partly with the
parties and their counsel. By virtue of the premises of party autonomy
itself, the parties bear responsibility for making their intentions known,
and they commonly could have done a much better job in that regard
than they did. But that will always be the case to some degree.
It is courts, led by the United States Supreme Court, that have made
fidelity to the parties' arbitral preferences a cardinal principle of
arbitration law, and it is they that ultimately have responsibility for
enforcing that principle. Yet, an examination of the multitude of cases in
which the parties disagree over the ground rules governing their
arbitration reveals that the courts do little better than improvise as they
try to identify what in fact the parties intended by way of arbitral process.
The contrast between the confidence with which the courts proclaim the
principle of fidelity to party intention in arbitral design, on the one hand,
and the precariousness of their conclusions as to what the parties actually
intended by way of arbitral design, on the other, is nothing short of
striking.
3. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10.
4. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, as implemented in the United States, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08. See also Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126
F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
5. E.g., Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 516 F.
Supp. 1305 (D. D.C. 1981).
6. E.g., Fortune, Alsweet & Eldridge, Inc. v. Daniel, 724 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983)
(per curiam).
7. E.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci~t& Gn6rale de l'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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To begin with, there is a greater diversity of arbitral process among
the various institutional and other rules available to the parties for
incorporation in their agreement than is commonly acknowledged.
Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is decidedly not
preemptive, in the sense of "occupying the field," 8 so that state law may
provide different or additional ground rules. The peculiarities not only
differ from state to state, but may differ according to the particular body
of law within any given state-the state law of contracts, the state law
governing arbitration agreements, and the state law of arbitration itselfthat one consults. The result is an environment in which, unanimity over
the general principle of party autonomy notwithstanding, uncertainty and
disagreement over the kind of arbitration the parties wanted easily arise.
Courts need to face that reality and seek more effectively to close the
intentions "gap." This article aims to illustrate the nature and magnitude
of the problem and begin an effort to mitigate it.

II.

THE ORIGINS: VOLTAND MASTROBUONO

In a pair of seminal rulings, the Supreme Court defined the federal
interest in arbitration as emphatically limited to effectuating the parties'
intention to resolve future disputes according to the procedural design
that the parties themselves selected, rather than according to some
standard arbitral model. Thus, while federal law seeks to promote
arbitration, the arbitration sought to be promoted is the arbitration that
the parties intended.
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University,9 the Court determined that the FAA
permitted application of a California statute postponing the arbitration
pending the outcome of related litigation involving persons not party to
the agreement to arbitrate. 10 Although the effect of the California law
could be described in general terms as not pro-arbitration, it was deemed
by the Court to be an integral part of the arbitral framework that the
parties had bargained for and that the FAA requires courts to support.
The Court reasoned that the parties, in choosing California law,1" had
adopted a procedural provision of California that permitted

8. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989).
9. Id.
10. California Arbitration Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1280 et seq. (West
1982).
11. The contract did not name California law as such as the governing law. Rather,
it provided that "[t]he Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the
Project is located," and the project was located in California. Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 65 (1995)
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postponement of arbitration under certain stated circumstances.
Moreover, the Court believed that it was bound by the state courts'
determination that the choice of law clause was to be
interpreted as
12
question.
in
provision
statutory
California
the
embracing
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,' 3 decided several
years later, the Court determined that the arbitration contemplated by the
parties was one that permitted the arbitrators to award punitive damages
in proper circumstances. This time, the Court did not base its conclusion
on the law chosen by the parties to govern their contract, since that law- 4
New York law-barred the award of such damages by arbitrators.1
Rather, the Court looked to the then-NASD rules of arbitration to which
the parties had also made specific reference in their agreement and
which, at the very least, did not foreclose the award of punitive damages.
This pair of cases represents only two of the innumerable scenarios
in which private parties, even while giving signals indicating the type of
arbitration they would want, leave the courts, and indeed the arbitrators,
in genuine doubt as to the specific features they intended their arbitration
to display.
The central problem in Volt was that the parties had incorporated
into their agreement a body of state law that constrained the arbitration in
ways that the state arguably could not have unilaterally imposed as a
matter of state policy. 5 However, the parties in Volt were deemed to
have incorporated that law by reference into their agreement, thus
making it an element of the arbitration meant to be championed by the
FAA's pro-arbitration policy. The question that Volt clearly raised was
whether and to what extent a policy that a state might not be permitted to
dictate to the parties is one that the parties could nevertheless be deemed
voluntarily to have embraced by electing that body of law.
The problems of party autonomy were compounded in
Mastrobuono. Not only did the parties voluntarily embrace a body of
law that restricted the arbitrators' powers of decision (much as in Volt),
but they confused matters further by also specifically referencing in their
arbitration agreement a body of procedural rules (the NASD Code of
12. Before the Supreme Court, Volt understandably argued that the state courts had
erred in interpreting the choice-of-law clause as bringing California rules of arbitral
procedure into their arbitration agreement, but the Supreme Court was unwilling to
review the state courts' interpretation of the contract, which it considered to be strictly a
question of state law. Volt, 489 U.S. at 474.
13. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
14. The New York Court of Appeals had ruled that under New York law only
judicial tribunals, and not arbitral tribunals, have the authority to award punitive
damages. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E. 2d 793 (1976).
15. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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Arbitration Procedure) that could be read as lifting that very restriction.
The Code itself was silent on the subject of punitive damages,
mentioning only "damages and other relief,"1 6 without more, and the
Court chose to read such silence as tacitly preserving the possibility of an
award of punitive damages. The Court drew support for this result from
the manual that the NASD furnished to its arbitrators, which stated that
"[t]he issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in
arbitrations [and that p]arties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators
can consider punitive damages as'a remedy." 7 Mastrobuono thus
involved not only a potential conflict between a state law rule and federal
policy in matters of arbitration, as in Volt, but doubt as to whether the
parties embraced that particular state law rule in the first place, when
other language in the agreement suggested that they preferred a set of
contrary ground rules. In other words, Mastrobuono was a case of
"mixed signals."
In fact, Volt and Mastrobuono entailed reference to only some, but
not all, potential indicators of party intention as to arbitral design. The
facts in Volt permitted the Court to focus on a California law providing
for the deferral of arbitration, while the facts in Mastrobuono permitted
the Court to consider the provisions of both New York law and the
NASD Code on the arbitrators' authority to award punitive damages. In
reality, there exists a much broader range of potential "extrinsic" sources
of party intent.
III. THE LAW OF THE CONTRACT AND THE LEXARBITRI
As noted, the Court in both Volt and Mastrobuono apparently
looked to the substantive state law that the parties had chosen. Its
decision to do so rests on debatable premises. It is useful, therefore, to
examine more deeply the Court's assumptions and analyses.
A.

Applying the Substantive Law of the Chosen State

Choice of law clauses come in various forms. In the great majority
of cases, the provision represents what courts have come to call a
"generic" choice of law clause,1 8 that is, a clause calling in general terms
for application of the designated state's law, without further specification
of any particular body of law within state law. Such was the case, for
example, in Volt.' 9 The Supreme Court recognized the problem inherent
16. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, P3741(e).
17. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 61 (1995).
18. Roadway Package Sys. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2001).
19. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 470 (1989).
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in treating a generic choice of law clause as incorporating a state's law of
arbitration, but it nevertheless chose to defer to the California courts'
view that the choice of law clause should be construed to include
California arbitration law. 20 Justice Brennan, dissenting, considered that
the Court was not bound by the state courts' treatment of a generic
choice of law clause as encompassing a state law provision on a narrow
question of arbitral procedure.21
Fortunately, in the great majority of cases since Volt, the courts
have rejected the notion that a generic choice of law clause should do
anything more than import into the transaction the state's rules of
substantive law-that is, the rules going to the merits of the underlying
dispute.2 2 Of course, the Mastrobuono decision strongly promoted this
development, since it rejected the idea that a generic choice of New York
law imported into the parties' contract a New York rule disallowing an
award of punitive damages by arbitrators. (In reaching this conclusion,
the Mastrobuono Court chose to treat the New York law rule as if it were
a rule of arbitral procedure rather than a substantive rule of law, 3 a
characterization that is, however, debatable.) As a result, courts have
mostly distanced themselves from the notion, to which Volt had lent at
least some support, that issues of arbitration law should be regarded as
falling within the ambit of a generic choice of law clause. For most
courts, only a clause specifically designating a state law to govern the
arbitration agreement has the effect of incorporating into the agreement
that state's law of arbitration.2 4
B.

The Often-Overlooked Lex Arbitri

If the law designated in a generic choice of law clause is not
ordinarily applicable to matters of arbitral procedure, then what law is
applicable? One obvious possibility is to have the lex arbitri, i.e., the
law governing the arbitration, govern matters of arbitral procedure.
Certainly, in international arbitration, the law of arbitration at the place
of arbitration is considered to supply the rules governing the arbitral
process itself.25 That is to say, the parties are deemed, in designating an

20. Id. at 475.
21. Id. at 479 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 283 F.Supp. 2d 602 (D.
Conn. 2003); Porush v. Lemiure, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Stephenson, 822 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
23. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701
(2005); UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998);
Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Baker Process, Inc., 210 F.Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
25. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1240ff. (2009).
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arbitral seat, to have submitted their arbitration as such to that body of
law, including its rules or presumptions as to arbitral design.
Fortunately, most rules of the lex arbitriturn out to be default rules only
(that is, rules from which the parties may agree to derogate), and few of
them are mandatory. The parties remain free to structure their arbitration
as they choose, with26the lex arbitrisupplying rules only to the extent the
parties fail to do so.

Yet, in both Volt and Mastrobuono, the lex arbitripassed entirely
unmentioned. The oversight is less remarkable in Mastrobuono, since
the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages could have been
regarded as implicating the substance of the dispute (and thus properly
governed by the substantive law chosen by the parties) rather than the
arbitral procedure itself (and thus properly governed by the lex arbitri).
More problematic is Volt, since the issue in question there-namely, the
propriety of suspending an arbitration pending the outcome of
litigation-relates chiefly to the conduct of the arbitration rather than to
the substance of the dispute. Yet, in both cases, the Court paid regard to
the substantive law of the contract and not to the law of the place of
arbitration.27
In Volt, at least, the error-if it was error-might be considered
harmless. The place of arbitration in that case seems likely, given the
contract's reference to the location of the parties and the construction
project, to have been California. (It is nevertheless revealing that the
Court nowhere indicates where the arbitration was to have taken place.)
California law was accordingly not only the applicable substantive law,
having been designated in the parties' choice of law clause, but in all
likelihood also the lex arbitri. However, the same cannot be said of
Mastrobuono, since the place of arbitration there appears to have been
Illinois, s yet the substantive law chosen by the parties was the law of
New York. Part of the autonomy parties in arbitration enjoy, after all, is
the autonomy to pick different jurisdictions as place of arbitration and
place of applicable law.
The two cases demonstrate that if, as Volt dictates, courts are to give
effect to the parties' expectations in terms of arbitral procedure-and in
so doing potentially consult both the chosen law and the lex arbitri as
sources of presumed party intent-they need to delineate more clearly
26.

Id. at 1241.

27. As noted, the Supreme Court did not seem entirely convinced that the California
rule in question represented a rule of substantive law, as opposed to a rule of arbitral
procedure. But, it felt bound to defer to the California courts' determination that the
election by the parties of California law as the governing law included the election of this
provision. See supra note 12.
28. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 54.

1020

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:4

than they often do the proper sphere of these two bodies of law. The lex
arbitri has a wide scope of application. It has been understood as
governing in principle both the internal and the external aspects of an
arbitration. 29 "Internal" issues relate principally to procedural aspects of
the arbitration, such as the required number of arbitrators, the availability
of provisional relief in the arbitration, discovery, and arbitrator ethics.
"External" issues, by contrast, concern the relationship between the
arbitral proceedings and national courts, typically the courts of the place
of arbitration, and thus entail such matters as judicial orders of
provisional relief, judicial aid in the gathering of evidence, and judicial
annulment of awards.
While the provision at issue in Volt, namely the "postponability" of
the arbitration, seems to fit somewhat more comfortably into the external
than the internal category of issues, it would appear, by any measure and
in any event, to be properly subject to California law as the lex arbitri.
What the California provision in question is not is a provision going to
the substance of the dispute. Unlike questions such as the scope of the
submission to arbitration or the forms of relief available to the arbitrators
(as was the issue in Mastrobuono), the question that the California
provision addresses does not even entail interpretation of the contract or
the arbitration agreement. In other words, whether the "postponability"
issue is characterizedas internal or external, it cannot reasonably be said
to come within the ambit of the substantive law governing the contract.
It is a lex arbitri issue. In sum, the Court did not do an especially good
job in these cases of delineating the respective spheres of a state's
substantive law, on the one hand, and its law of arbitration, on the other.
In point of fact, an examination of the domestic post-Volt cases
finds that, even when courts properly refuse to apply a generic choice of
law clause to an issue of arbitral process, they rarely turn to the law of
the site of arbitration as a source.30 In the majority of cases in which
post- Volt courts decide whether to enforce a given provision of state law
relating to arbitral design, they do not consult the law of the place of
arbitration. As in Volt and Mastrobuono alike, the place of arbitration
may not even be mentioned.
This finding is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
disregarding the law of the arbitral situs on arbitration issues may, albeit

29. BORN, supra note 25, at 1241-43.
30. See, e.g., H.D. Brous & Co., Inc. v. Mrzyglocki, No. 03 CIV. 8385 (CSH), 2004
WL 1367451 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004); Arnold v. Goldstar Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 01 C
7694, 2002 WL 1941546 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 22, 2002); Painewebber, Inc. v. Landay, 905 F.
Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995).
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rarely, prejudice the validity of the award 3 1 or its eventual recognition or
enforcement.3 2 In addition, ignoring the lex arbitri in domestic FAA
cases introduces a strange dissonance between the interstate and the
international cases, for in international cases, courts do generally
consider the arbitration law of the arbitral situs as the law providing the
legal framework of the arbitration.33 It is understandable that courts pay
closer attention to the distinction between substantive law and the lex
arbitriin international cases, but there is no principled reason why they
should do so. Finally, not all contracts-not even all commercial
contracts-contain a choice of law clause. In the absence of such a
clause and of a .role for the lex arbitri, courts have no choice but to
embark on an inquiry into which jurisdiction has the closest connection
with the contract or the greatest claim to have its rules of law apply.34
Such a practice can only lead to uncertainty.
In fact, courts often (and especially when the choice of law clause is
a generic rather than arbitration-specific one) apply some combination of
FAA case law, including the FAA's so-called "pro-arbitration bias," 35 on
the one hand, and the judicial forum's own law of arbitration, 36 on the
other. Note that the judicial forum will not necessarily be the same as
the arbitral forum. The court that will hear an action to confirm or vacate
an award will ordinarily be the court of the place of arbitration (i.e., the
place that furnished the lex arbitri),37 but there is no guarantee that that
3 1. The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes vacatur of an award "3) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced."
32. Article Vl(d) of the New York Convention authorizes courts to refuse
recognition or enforcement where "the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law
of the country where the arbitration took place." See also Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim &
Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1042
(1998).
33. See BoRN, supra note 25, at 1240ff.
34. See, for example, UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration: "[Flailing any
designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the
conflict of law rules which it considers applicable."
35. E.g., Progressive Casualty Ins., Co. v. CA Reaseguradora Nacional de
Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1993).
36. In CRS SirrineEng'rs,Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 96-11749-GAO,
1997 WL 136335 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 1997), the federal district court sitting in
Massachusetts looked not only to the federal policy favoring arbitration, but also to the
Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act to determine the circumstances in which
consolidation of separate arbitrations was proper. There is no indication in the case of
what the place of arbitration was to be. The Court may have applied Massachusetts law
on account of that state being the forum state. See also Kilmer v. Flocar, Inc., 212 F.R.D.
66 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
37. The New York Convention, Article V1(e) implies that an award may be vacated
or confirmed not only by the courts of the place where the award was made, but, also, in
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will be the case in an action to compel arbitration or to recognize or
enforce an award. In the latter cases, application of forum law will often
make little or no sense.
In sum, it is not enough for courts to distinguish between "generic"
and "arbitration-specific" choice of law clauses, desirable as such a
distinction may be. Courts should also seriously distinguish between the
issues most properly determined by the chosen law and those most
properly determined by the lex arbitri. Of course, consideration must
always be given to the FAA and to FAA case law, since no body of state
law may operate to frustrate the overriding federal policy in favor of
arbitration of disputes where the parties have indeed agreed to arbitrate.38
C.

Conflicts between State Law and the FAA

Whether the intent of the parties as to a given issue of arbitral
design is determined by reference to the law of the contract, the law of
the arbitration agreement, or the lex arbitri,the question remains whether
the parties may, through incorporation by reference, select a state law
that is inconsistent with the FAA and its underlying policies.
On the one hand, Supreme Court rulings establish that the FAA's
pro-arbitration purposes, coupled with the Supremacy Clause, operate to
bar States from enforcing laws that render certain causes of action nonarbitrable,39 that treat agreements to arbitrate as any less enforceable than
other private agreements, 40 or that otherwise impede the overriding
federal policy in favor of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.4 1
A State, therefore, may not create a cause of action and declare it to be
non-arbitrable, impose conditions on the enforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate that it does not impose on private agreements generally, or
otherwise frustrate Congress' pro-arbitration policy. That much seems
clear.
On the other hand, if the parties are truly the architects of their
arbitration, as Volt insists, then they are surely free to include in their
arbitration agreement the language of a state statute that is, in itself,
inhospitable to arbitration. Taking Volt again as an example, nothing
would have prevented the parties from agreeing in their contract that any
arbitration initiated pursuant to their agreement would be subject to stay
the rare case where the parties have agreed that the arbitration should be governed by an
arbitration law of a state other than the place of arbitration.
38. Doctor's Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995).
39. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
40. Casarotto,517 U.S. 681; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
41. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477-78 (1989); see also Casarotto,517 U.S. 681.
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or suspension by a court in the event that the same or closely related
dispute happened to be the subject of court proceedings involving a
person who was not a party to the arbitration agreement. Indeed, they
could have "cut and pasted" the California provision into the body of
their arbitration agreement. Having expressed their preference as to
arbitral procedure, the parties would be entitled, according to Volt, to
have that preference respected. In other words, they would have
effectively made that feature as much an element of their arbitration as
any other one they built into their agreement. The same conclusion
would follow if the parties merely referred to the specific state law
provision, as by its title or section number. Whether the incorporation is
achieved in haec verba or by specific identification, the parties would
have acknowledged that the state statute had become part of their
agreement to arbitrate.
In the great majority of cases, however, we find ourselves with
neither a state law on its own impermissibly restricting the arbitration,
nor an express incorporation of that law into the parties' arbitration
agreement. All we have is a reference to a chosen substantive law and
perhaps an indication of the intended place of arbitration. This is, of
course, the scenario in Volt, except that there the Court avoided the
difficulty by essentially finding no inconsistency between the California
statute and the policies underlying the FAA. According to the Volt
Court, the California statute merely addressed the sequence between
arbitration and litigation,42 a determination upon which the federal policy
favoring arbitration did not depend. The Court found that such a
provision on timing was not capable of "undermin[ing] the goals and
policies of the FAA. 43
By determining in a conclusory fashion that the California law was
not "arbitration-unfriendly," the Court failed to probe meaningfully into
the degree of dissonance between the California statute and the FAA's
pro-arbitration philosophy. But, the question whether the required
postponement of arbitration was sufficiently arbitration-unfriendly as to
offend the FAA called for a more serious inquiry by the Court.
Arguably, a postponement of arbitration affects a good deal more than
mere timing. The point of postponing arbitration is to avoid an
42. "[W]e think the California arbitration rules which the parties have incorporated
into their contract generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration .... [T]he FAA
itself contains no provision designed to deal with the special practical problems that arise
in multiparty contractual disputes when some or all of the contracts include agreements to
arbitrate. California has taken the lead in fashioning a legislative response to this
problem by giving courts authority to consolidate or stay arbitration proceedings in these
situations in order to minimize the potential for contradictory judgments." Volt, 489 U.S.
at 476 n.5.
43. Id. at 478.
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inconsistency of result between the outcomes of the litigation and
arbitration. 4 But, that objective can only be achieved by treating the
parties to the later proceeding (the arbitration) as bound by the
determinations reached in the prior proceeding (the litigation), and that in
turn can only be achieved by depriving the arbitrators of the right to
make the relevant determinations independently. Only with difficulty
can such a result be regarded as arbitration-friendly. In short, the Court
in Volt plainly missed an opportunity to clarify what it takes for a state
law provision to thwart the substantive federal policy favoring the
arbitration of disputes.
The courts would do well to confront this problem more squarely
than the Supreme Court did in Volt. It is one thing for courts to impute
to the parties default rules of arbitration contained in either the law
governing the contract or in the lex arbitri. It is another thing to give
effect to inhospitable state laws on the basis of a fiction that the parties
knowingly made those laws a part of their contract and thereby part of
the arbitration. A distinction should be drawn between state law
provisions that the parties specifically acknowledged and those they did
not-with the former, and only the former, deemed to reflect an
expression of party intent as to arbitral design sufficient to overcome the
presumption of inapplicability of state laws that are inconsistent with the
FAA.
Not only did the Supreme Court fail seriously to consider whether
application of the California law would undermine the federal policy
favoring arbitration, but it failed even to consider how likely it was that
the parties had any expectation, in selecting California law as the
substantive law of the contract, of embracing a purely procedural rule
that would effectively remove crucial issues from the arbitration and
submit them to a litigation process that they had sought to avoid. In
other words, the Court did a poor job of assessing the impact of the
California law on the viability of the arbitration, and no job at all of
assessing the likelihood that the parties meant to embrace California's
postponement mechanism in the first place.
If the Court is serious about protecting arbitration from hostile state
law, it has every reason to keep FAA-inconsistent state law from
creeping too easily into the definition of the kind of arbitration for which
the parties contracted. But it cannot possibly hope to succeed in that
effort without giving greater and clearer content than it did in Volt to the
notion of conflict between state law rules and mechanisms regarding
arbitration, on the one hand, and the federal policy favoring arbitration,
on the other.
44.
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IV. RULES OF ARBITRATION
Another obvious extrinsic source of party intention-in addition to
the law governing the contract as a whole, the law governing the
arbitration agreement, and the law of the place of arbitration-is the
body of rules of arbitral procedure that the parties may have adopted in
their arbitration agreement. It seems fair to suppose that the parties, in
incorporating such rules into their arbitration agreement, mean for them
to fill gaps in that agreement, subject to any mandatory rules of law of
the place of arbitration that may apply.45
A.

Rules ofArbitralProcedure

To the extent that courts seek, as Volt requires, to determine the
kind of arbitration the parties intended to have, rules of arbitral procedure
designated in an arbitration agreement have a central role to play.
Whether the parties specifically designated a set of procedural rules, or
simply chose a specific administering arbitral institution that has
promulgated procedural rules, those rules are properly considered as
having been incorporated into the arbitration agreement.4 6 Even if the
parties were personally unfamiliar with the rules, they signed an
arbitration agreement that specifically incorporated them, and may
properly be treated as intending them to govern the arbitration.
Obviously, such rules can be displaced by more specific terms in the
arbitration agreement 47 and can also be supplanted by inconsistent
mandatory rules of the arbitral forum.4 8 Otherwise, they should be
considered as elements of the arbitral design that the parties chose and
that Volt expects the courts to enforce.
In some respects, imputing rules of arbitral procedure to the parties
is a more reliable exercise than imputing to them provisions of the
governing law or the lex arbitri. When parties make a generic choice of
law to govern their contract, they contemplate that the chosen law will
determine their respective rights and obligations and the relief to which
they are entitled in the event of breach.
Rarely will they be
contemplating the rules of that jurisdiction concerning the arbitration of
45. E.g., Coastal Caisson Corp. v. E.E. Cruz/NAB/Frontier-Kemper, Nos. 05 Civ.
7462(DLC), 05 Civ. 7466, 2007 WL 2285936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007); Williamson v.
Public Storage, Inc., No. 3:03CVI242(RNC), 2004 WL 491058 (D. Conn. Mar. 1, 2004).
46. E.g., St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Worthy Bros. Pipeline Corp., No. 967745, 1997 WL 187332 (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 1997).
47. Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831-32 (11 th Cir. 1991).
48. See UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration, Rule 2.1 ("These Rules shall govern the
arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of law
applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall
prevail ...

").
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eventual disputes. (The situation is obviously different when a choice of
law clause states that it specifically governs the arbitration agreement or
the arbitration itself.) It is true that parties contemplate arbitration more
specifically when they designate a place of arbitration and, to that extent,
the lex arbitri looks like a better indicator of party intent as to arbitral
design than the body of substantive law chosen to govern the contract.
However, parties select arbitral sites for many reasons having nothing to
do with the rules of arbitral procedure at the situs. There is little reason
to assume that the parties, in selecting a lex arbitri, considered every
procedural prescription in the local law, however advisable it would have
been for them to do so. By contrast, parties to a contract cannot
reasonably suppose that, in designating specific rules of arbitral
procedure, they are doing anything other than expressing their mutual
preferences as to arbitral design.
Incorporation of rules of arbitral procedure in an agreement to
arbitrate does not resolve all problems associated with determining
arbitral design. The rules themselves may not speak with sufficient
clarity to all procedural issues. More importantly, the rules of arbitral
procedure adopted by the parties may point in a different direction than
the lex arbitri,the law chosen to govern the contract, or the law chosen
specifically to govern the arbitration agreement or the arbitration itself.
Reconciling the diverse indications contained in the multiplicity of
extrinsic sources referred to or implied in the arbitration agreement or
main contract is not always a simple task.
B.

When Laws and Rules Collide

The Mastrobuono case exemplifies the not uncommon situation in
which an arbitration agreement refers to multiple extrinsic sources that
may conflict with one another. It will be recalled that New York law,
which the parties had selected as goveming law, apparently precluded
the award of punitive damages by arbitral tribunals, 49 whereas the NASD
Code arguably authorized arbitrators to award them.5 ° Clearly, the Court
felt considerable tension between the two sources, and strove mightily to
reconcile them.
Ultimately, the Court permitted the parties' designation of the
NASD arbitral rules to carry the day. It reasoned that the only way to
give effect both to the parties' choice of New York law and to their
adoption of the NASD rules was to confine the designation of New York
law to New York substantive law (which was proper) and to characterize

49.
50.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the question of the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages as
a procedural one (which was at the very least debatable). 5' This
reasoning resulted in permitting the NASD rules to control52the punitive
damages question, effectively putting an end to the conflict.
Once again, however, the Court showed little interest in gauging the
likelihood that the parties to the arbitration agreement had contemplated
(or would have contemplated if they thought about the matter) that the
availability of damages in arbitration would be governed by a norm
found in the NASD rules as opposed to one found in the substantive law
of New York. On the one hand, the Court might have noted the greater
specificity of New York law on the availability of punitive damages in
arbitration, as compared to the at-best-oblique reference to the subject in
the NASD rules. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that, if the
parties had sought an answer to the punitive damages question, they
would more likely have looked in the NASD rules governing the
arbitration than in the body of substantive law to which they had
subjected their contract as a whole. The likelihood was that the parties
chose the NASD Code as the source of procedural rules of arbitration
(including rules on available remedies) and New York law as governing
the merits of any eventual dispute. In point of fact, the NASD Code said
little that would have put the parties effectively on notice that punitive
damages were off limits in an eventual arbitration.
The fact is that, notwithstanding their obvious relevance to the
question of how the tension between New York case law and the NASD
rules should be resolved, the Court in Mastrobuono did not make much
of an inquiry into any of these considerations. 53 Arbitrators and courts
alike need a surer basis than the one provided in Mastrobuono on which
to sort out the "mixed signals" sent by the various extrinsic sources that
the parties refer to in their agreement, directly or indirectly, as pertinent
to arbitral design.
51. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995). The
Court reinforced its position by positing that the choice of law clause was merely a
substitute for the choice of law analysis that the forum would otherwise have had to
conduct in deciding what law to apply. Id. The Court reasoned that, had there been no
choice of law clause, but instead New York law had been indicated by the forum's
general choice of law principles, then New York law would still have been applicable,
without there being in the contract anything (like the choice of law clause) that could be
regarded as manifesting an intention to embrace New York law and thus to exclude the
possibility of punitive damages. Id. In that event, absent an expression of party intention
to embrace New York law, the FAA would govern and would preempt the New York
courts' prohibition on the award of punitive damages by arbitrators. Id. at 59.
52. To the extent that the availability of punitive damages is a matter of substantive
rather than procedural law, the lower courts correctly understood it as subject to the
choice of law clause.
53.

See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has emphatically stated that the parties are the
masters not only of their private agreements, but also of the kind of
arbitration they want, if and when disputes arise out of those agreements.
In so doing, the Court rejected the notion that the Federal Arbitration
Act, which recognizes arbitration in interstate and foreign commerce as a
matter of genuine federal concern, imposes any particular arbitral model
on the parties or the courts. It is true that the Court has recently
suggested that the FAA curbs the parties' freedom to determine
contractually the role and function that courts should play in determining
whether an award merits confirmation or vacatur.54 That decision,
however, left party autonomy entirely intact insofar as the arbitral
process itself, as opposed to judicial review of it, is concerned.
The Court's determination to rally behind party autonomy in arbitral
design has not, however, been matched by a similar show of
determination as to how the intended arbitral design is to be ascertained.
Judicial shortcomings in this respect are several in number and
important. First, the courts have been slow to circumscribe the role, if
any, that generic choice of law clauses should play as an indicator of
preferences in arbitral design. Fortunately, a distinction between generic
and arbitration-specific choice of law clauses is coming into focus,
though doubts persist over what is and what is not an arbitration-specific
issue.55 More generally, the respective spheres of a state's substantive
law and its law of arbitration remain poorly delineated. Still more
problematic is the unexplained neglect of the law of the place of
arbitration as an extrinsic source of arbitral design in domestic FAA
cases-a neglect that is all the more peculiar in light of the preponderant
role of the lex arbitri as an indicator of party intent on such issues in
international arbitration cases.
Whether courts derive indications of arbitral design from state
substantive or state arbitration law, there remains the potential for
conflict between such state law and the pro-arbitration bias that the FAA
is said to embody as a matter of federal law. While the FAA certainly
does not "occupy the field" of arbitration in the United States, it does bar
the application of state law that is inimical to the federal policy. On the
other hand, Volt plainly allows parties to adopt "arbitration-unfriendly"

54. Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., No. 06-989, 552 U.S. - (2008); see
also 9 U.S.C. § 10.
55. Recall that in the Mastrobuono case, the Court determined that the availability of
punitive damages in arbitration is an arbitration-specific issue, even though the
availability of punitive damages, as such, is a matter of substantive law. Mastrobuono,
514 U.S. at 62.
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provisions of state law as elements of their arbitration model, provided
they do so clearly enough to indicate an intention to that effect. But
courts should be more reluctant than they have been to interpret the mere
inclusion in a contract of a choice of law clause-particularly a generic
choice of law clause-as signaling a contractual embrace of every
"arbitration-unfriendly" provision that the state law happens to contain,
thereby unleashing Volt's requirement of judicial support for them all.
Once courts become more vigilant in this regard, they will be less able to
avoid the difficult but essential task of determining where the line
between "arbitration-neutral" and "arbitration-unfriendly" state law is to
be drawn.
The trend in contemporary practice of drafting arbitration
agreements toward selecting multiple extrinsic sources of arbitral
design-including various bodies of law and various institutional and
procedural regimes-makes the incidence of what I term "mixed signals"
increasingly probable. Volt insisted that the FAA's core function is to
ensure enforcement of the arbitration, and only the arbitration, for which
the parties bargained. Fidelity to that idea requires a more principled
methodology for sorting out the signals than cases such as Mastrobuono
and its progeny have thus far yielded. That methodology should
privilege those indications of party intention in matters of arbitral design
that strike courts as most probative of the parties' actual or probable
intentions. Otherwise, the principles for which Volt and Mastrobuono
stand will simply not be realized.

